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ABSTRACT

The Multi-Fiber Arrangement is a classic case
of protectionism that was justified as a departure
from the principles of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) to fulfill the spirit and
purposes of the GATT. In this paper, I identify
three fundamental objectives of the MFA: to
liberalize trade in textiles; to achieve expansion,
of trade while at the same time ensuring the
orderly and equitable development of this trade
and the avoidance of disruptive effects in
individual markets; and, to further the economic
and social development of developing countries by
securing for them increased earnings from textile
exports. I then examine empirical evidence to test
whether these aims have been achieved. I find that
none of the stated aims of the MFA has been
fulfilled and that, worse, by establishing, in
effect, a cartel of textile producers, the MFA has
introduced unforseen negative consequences of its
own; it has made it extremely difficult for late
industrializing countries of the Third World, like
Bangladesh, to exploit gains from comparative
advantage; it has benefitted politically strong,
anti-market industrializing nations, like China;
it has created vested interests among exporting
countries as they compete for economic rents; and,
most important, it has entrenched protectionism in
the international trading system.
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THE MULTI-FIBER ARRANGEMENT IN THE LOOM OF NORTH-SOUTH
POLITICS

INTRODUCTION

This paper examines the Arrangement Regarding
International Trade in Textiles, also known as the MultiFiber Arrangement (MFA), as a classic case of protectionism
that predates by nearly a decade the protectionist challenge
to the international trading order that began to emerge in
the mid-1970s. It focuses on an important North-South issue
that has become one of the thorniest items on the agenda of
international trade. In the competition for markets between
the North and the South, the textile industry has witnessed
protectionism during the last thirty years and is, in fact,
one of the most heavily protected sectors today.
The paper provides powerful evidence of limits of
Northern tolerance for Southern competition. The textile
industry is important to both developed countries (DCs) and
less developed countries (LDCs), although it can be argued
that it is more significant to developing countries given
its labor-intensive character and low capital requirements.
Developing nations enjoy a comparative advantage in trade in
textiles and see it as a significant channel through which
they can make in-roads into the development process. The
North, however, has resisted imports from developing
2
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nations. They have closed their markets significantly to
imports from industrializing countries, although they have
kept their markets open to imports from developed countries!
Protection in this sector has bypassed the effective
framework of the GATT. The paper demonstrates that although
the explicit rationale of the Arrangement was in conformity
with the broader purposes of the GATT, it was a fundamental
departure from the established principles of the GATT. I
provide empirical evidence to demonstrate that in the thirty
years of its operation, the Arrangement has failed to
achieve any of its putative goals. Worse, the Arrangement
has introduced market distortions of its own and, in effect,
by creating a cartel among textile exporters, has first,
made it extremely difficult for late industrializing
countries of the Third World, like Bangladesh, to exploit
gains from comparative advantage. Second, it has benefitted
politically strong, anti-market industrializing nations,
like China. Third, it has created vested interests among
exporting countries as they compete for economic rents.
Fourth, and most important, it has entrenched protectionism
in the international trading system.
Before examining the MFA, however, it is important to
consider its significance in light of broader developments
in the international trading order since the Second World
War.

4

GATT AND THE POSTWAR LIBERALIZATION OP TRADE

The collapse of the international economic system of
the inter-war years set the stage for a new economic order
after World War II. In the United States, the disastrous
repercussions of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930,
whereby virtually every industry was rewarded with its own
made-to-order tariff, taught the architects of the postwar
order the folly of such legislation. The high trade barriers
and their counterproductive results during the Depression
helped to stack the cards in favor of pro-trade forces,
providing the ideological momentum for liberal international
trade.1 A wiser United States and a war-ravaged United
Kingdom marshalled forces to reconstruct the economic system
resulting in a new international economic order that
recognized gains from free trade.
Such liberal sentiment was soon institutionalized.
October 1947 witnessed the birth of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The preamble to the GATT
eloquently declared its objective to be the pursuit of
"reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements directed
to the substantial reduction of tariffs and other barriers
to trade and to the elimination of discriminatory treatment
in international commerce." Two major principles of the GATT

1For a detailed account of the move towards trade
liberalization after WWII and then the gradual move towards
protection,
see
Jagdish
Bhagwati,
Protectionism
(Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1989).
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were nondiscrimination and multilateralism. These principles
ensured that no country would be discriminated —

any trade

concessions made to one country would apply to all. Managed
trade, which seeks quantitative targets of outcomes in
trade, instead of setting rules and letting the chips fall
where they may, was barred by the Agreement.
The decade of the fifties and sixties saw a tremendous
growth in international trade based on these solemn
principles of the GATT. It witnessed the emergence of such
economic giants as Hong Kong, Taiwan, Korea, and Singapore.
Perhaps Japan offers the best example of the potential gains
from free trade as the liberal trading order allowed Japan
to recover from the cataclysmic events of the atomic bomb
and emerge as an economic superpower.
However, by the second half of the 1970s, free trade
had produced a fundamental reordering in the world's
international economic and political relationships. The
economic hegemony of America began to decline as Japan and
then European nations lifted themselves out of the ruins of
the world war. More importantly, as just mentioned, newly
industrialized countries (NICs) began to emerge as economic
forces to be reckoned with. This became a cause for much
concern to developed countries as they began to lose their
competitive edge in the world market. To preserve their
leadership, rules governing international trade as embodied
in the GATT began to lose their sanctity. The principles of

6

free trade, nondiscrimination and multilateralism were cast
aside and international trade witnessed rapidly increasing
barriers that undermined the principle of free trade. These
barriers, more often, came in the form of non-tariff
barriers (NTBs) that included the imposition of import
quotas, voluntary export restraints, administrative
authorizations to import, price monitoring procedures,
customs clearance procedures, and manufacturing and export
subsidies. Of all the NTBs, the most popular one is
voluntary export restraints (VERs). In the early 1970s,
there were fewer than a dozen known VERs in force. In 198 0,
the number had grown to 80. By 1990, the VERs totalled 200.
Aside from growing in number and range of application, the
VERs were directed with increasing frequency against exports
from developing countries.2
Economists regard NTBs as worse than tariffs given
their limited transparency and discriminatory character.
This is because they cannot be quantified as tariffs and
therefore do not provide some basis for assessing an
"equivalence" of concessions on each side for measuring the
significance of the bargain struck; neither can they be
reduced to bilateral agreements and then generalized.3 This

2Enzo Grilli
Protectionist. Wave
1990), 150-151.

and Enrico Sassoon,
eds., The New
(New York: New York University Press,

3The GATT Negotiations 1986-1990: Origins. Issues and
Prospects (UK: British-North American Committee, 1988), 9-10.
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makes them highly discriminatory and difficult to negotiate
in the GATT rounds.
Thus, by the end of the 1970s, open trade was replaced
by "managed trade" that was discriminatory and largely
outside the effective framework of the GATT.
Managed trade — restricting imports, protecting
domestic workers/jobs, manipulating exchange rates
so exports are cheaper, earning a balance-ofpayments surplus — means to break all GATT rules.
Managed trade means it is better to protect the
income of steel, of textiles, than raise the total
income of the nation, the industrial countries,
and the world. It means more detailed control over
sectors, firms and employees because government
never gets it right for all players. It means
permanent control, permanent protection, permanent
government intervention.4
Jan Tumlir, GATT’s director of economic research and
analysis from 1964 to 1985, sums up the situation in today's
international trading order well, when he says:
"The new protectionism is a very different animal.
It has been growing gradually. Industries have
used intelligent long-term planning in creating an
expanded system of protection. The expansion moves
sectorally ... each tailored to the special needs
of the industry in question.... The protectionism
of the 1930s was openly adversary; the new one,
however, builds on negotiation. As a result the
new protectionism is politically stronger because
it accommodates a broader range of interests....
For all these reasons the new protectionism will
be much more difficult to roll back."5

4Douglas F. Lamont, Forcing Our Hand: America's Trade
Wars in the 1980s (Massachusetts: D.C. Heath and Company,
1986), 118-119.
5Jan Tumlir, Protectionism: Trade Policy in Democratic
Societies (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for
Public Policy Research, 1985), 38.

CHAPTER 1

Towards the end of the Second World War the United
States and United Kingdom met to decide the shape of the
postwar international economic order. Governments of both
countries wanted to avoid the economic policy mistakes
during the interwar years. The 1944 Bretton Woods conference
produced an agreement to establish the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (World Bank) institutions
essential to an open trading regime, but limited in scope to
international financial issues. In March 1948, over fifty
countries signed the Havana.Charter to form an International
Trade Organization (ITO). But after the U.S. Congress failed
to approve American participation in the ITO, "all that
remained after years of intensive negotiations was a trade
agreement signed in October 1947 designed to record the
results of a tariff conference that was envisioned at the
time as being the first of a number of such conferences to
be conducted under the auspices of the ITO."6 The results
of this conference were codified in the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) which consisted of the tariff
6Jock A. Finlayson and Mark W. Zacher, "The GATT and the
Regulation of Trade Barriers: Regime Dynamics and Functions"
International Organization vol. 35 no. 4 (Autumn 1981): 566.
8
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concessions agreed to by the twenty-three signatories. Since
the ITO failed to materialize, the GATT was transformed from
a temporary agreement into a normative institutional
framework in which governments pursued multilateral
regulation and discussed trade policy.7
The preamble to the GATT eloquently declared its
objective as the pursuit of "reciprocal and mutually
advantageous arrangements directed to the substantial
reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade and to the
elimination of discriminatory treatment in international
commerce." In pursuance of its objectives, the GATT laid
down rules codifying the principles of multilateralism and
nondiscrimination that would enable Contracting Parties to
reap gains from free trade. Some of the principal norms of
the GATT are:
(1) Nondiscrimination: The former Director-General of GATT,
Eric Wyndham-White declared the principle of nondiscrimin
ation as the "cornerstone" of the GATT.8 "In the immediate
postwar era it was regarded as the crucial GATT norm, if
only because the immensely powerful United States saw it
necessary for the both the expansion of its own trade and
the forestalling of hostile economic blocs."9 The GATT
7Finlayson and Zacher, 562.
8Eric Wyndham-White, "Negotiations in Prospect," in C.
Fred Bergsten, ed. , Toward a New World Trade Policy: The
Maidenhead Papers (Massachusetts: D.C. Heath, 1975), 321.
9Finlayson and Zacher, 565.
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The GATT commitment to nondiscrimination— or "unconditional
most-favored-nation" (MFN) treatment, is cited in Article
1:1 of the General Agreement and requires that "any
advantage, favor, privilege, or immunity granted by any
contracting party to any product originating in or destined
for any other country shall be accorded immediately and
unconditionally to the like product originating in or
destined for the territories as all other contracting
parties." The fact that unanimous consent is required to
amend Article 1 underlines the importance attached to
nondiscrimination at the time of GATT's formation.
(2) A "fix-rule" trading regime: The Agreement explicitly
stated in Article 16 that a "fixed-quantity" regime

or

managed trade which seeks quantitative targets of outcomes
in trade, instead of settling on rules and letting the chips
fall where they may, is to be rejected.
(3) Multilateralism: Bilateral discriminatory agreements
were discouraged through this principle. Trade rules under
the GATT were to be extended without discrimination and to
all members of the trading regime alike.
(4) Open Markets: Markets were to be opened through
conventional reduction in trade barriers, and new
disciplines were sought to be established by resort to
mutuality and balance of concessions.
(5) Reciprocity: Trade concessions were to be contracted on
the basis of "reciprocity", so that there would be mutual

11

exchanges.
The regime of freer trade reflected in the formulation
of the GATT was justified by the developed countries (DCs)
with the formal argument of economic efficiency of
international trade. Trade tends to promote the
international division of labor, to allocate limited
resources and thereby to raise the standards of living in
all trading countries. From this perspective, all of the
GATT's work would be directed towards eliminating as many as
possible barriers to international trade. Therefore, GATT
Article XI prohibits the use of quotas or measures other
than duties to restrict either imports or exports. The
experience of widespread and escalating use of quotas during
the 193 0s influenced the ITO-GATT draftsmen to try to
abolish this technique of trade restraint.10
Immediately following the birth of the GATT, the world
witnessed an unprecedented growth in the volume of
international trade. World trade expanded five fold between
1950 and 1970; world production expanded 4.5 times.11 World
economic expansion quickened after 1960. Between 1960 and
1972 world trade grew by an average rate of 7.9 per cent a

10John H. Jackson, The World Trading System; Law and
Policy of International Economic Relations (Cambridge: MIT
Press, 1989), 129.
11Penelope
Hartland-Thunberg,
Trading
Blocs.
U.S.
Exports.and World Trade (Boulder: Westview Press, 1980), 1.
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year, world GNP by an average of 5 percent.12 These twenty
years of remarkable gains in the volume of international
trade have come to be known as the golden years of the GATT.
Under the auspices of the GATT, there have been eight rounds
of multilateral trade negotiations,13 each succeeding in
reducing tariff levels substantially. In the United States,
for example, the average tariff declined by nearly 95
percent over the forty years between the Geneva Round of
1947 and the start of the Uruguay Round in 1986— from an
average of nearly 13 percent on dutiable imports in 1946 to
an average of less than 5 percent by 1988.14
The less-developed countries have, however, long
maintained an ambivalent position vis-a-vis the GATT. The
ambiguous language of the safeguard clause was a special
cause for concern. Under the GATT safeguard clause (Article
XIX), emergency protective action, such as imposition of
quantitative restrictions or an increase in tariff rates, is
permitted when imports enter "in such increased quantities
or under such conditions as to cause or threaten serious
injury to domestic producers." However, the word "serious"
was not defined in the Arrangement. Nor did it establish
12Hartland-Thunberg, 1.
13Geneva 1947; Annecy 1949; Torquay 1951; Geneva 1956;
Dillon 1960-61; Kennedy 1964-67; Tokyo 1973-79; Uruguay 19861990:

14John H. Jackson and William J. Davey, Legal Problems of
International Economic Relations (St. Paul: West Publishing,
1986), 9.
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time limits for the lifting of such safeguards. Article XIX
thus makes it difficult to define the boundary between
safeguard and protection and has increasingly been exploited
by the industrial countries.
Also, labelling it a rich man's club, the LDCs'
objections were rooted in the notion that neoclassical trade
theory has little to offer for their specific problems. They
were critical of the Agreement, alleging that, given the
different levels of economic development between the North
and South, across-the-board rules were not fair.
Additionally, the LDCs denounced certain specific rules
of the GATT: reciprocity appeared to be hardly suitable to
economic "have-nots": nondiscrimination seemed to threaten
infant industry, whose protection was considered necessary
for rapid industrialization.
For these reasons, the LDCs lobbied for special
treatment under the rules of the GATT. At the first United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) a
report was designed to focus attention on the need for
special rules for the trade of developing countries. Since
this idea of preferences was inconsistent with the MFN
clause, a new legal exception to MFN was drafted for the
benefit of developing countries. In 1971, the Generalized
System of Trade Preferences (GSP) was established which
agreed to a "mutually acceptable system of generalized non
reciprocal and non-discriminatory preferences which would be

14

beneficial to developing countries."15 "However, [the GSP]
is still what we might call a subsidiary norm since the
major trading states appear willing to make only limited
sacrifices to promote the trade interests of the developing
countries."16 In 1979 contracting parties accepted an
"Enabling Clause" which set up a permanent legal framework
for the differential and more favorable treatment of LDCs in
international trade relations, notwithstanding the
provisions of Article 1 (1) of the General Agreement. The
main provisions of the text read as follows:
Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 1 of the
General Agreement, Contracting Parties may accord
differential and more favorable treatment to developing
countries, without according such treatment to other
Contracting Parties.17
The GATT has come to be regarded by most economists as
the anchor of the postwar international trading order. It is
accepted as the constitution of the international trading
system. The GATT framework encompasses basic elements needed
to institute a viable system of international trade
regulation: an arena to discuss and review different
policies and trends; a capacity to formulate rules to guide
behavior and adapt to changing conditions; and a means to
resolve, formally and informally, trade disputes arising

15UNCTAD Proceedings 2nd. sess., vol. 1 (1968): 38.
16Jock and Finlayson, 582.
17GATT, Document L/4903 of December 3, 1979.
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among its members.18 It thus lends stability and
predictability in the trading environment.
However, since the mid-197 0s, the GATT has not been
able to guide or regulate international trade as it did
before. Some economists, therefore, have argued that it has
become less effective and credible as a trade
constitution.19 Trade experience shows that over the last
two decades, countries have ignored the mandate of the GATT
and the ideals for which it stands. The history of NorthSouth international trade reveals that in some sectors, like
textiles, the North bypassed the principles of the GATT.
Industrialized countries like the U.S. and consortiums like
the EEC, have imposed quantitative barriers to trade, and
have also conducted trade that is discriminatory by nature.
They removed trade barriers for each other but erected
increasingly stringent barriers for developing countries,
although the GATT explicitly stated that trade should be
conducted on the principle of nondiscrimination.
As pointed out earlier, such discriminatory protection
came in the form of NTBs which affect suppliers more
adversely than tariffs. "NTBs may be defined as including
all governmental policies and practices which serve to
18John H. Jackson, "GATT Machinery and the Tokyo Round
Agreements" in Trade Policy in the 1980s ed. William R. Cline
(Washington D.C.: Institute for International Economics,
1987), 160-61.
19Robert M. Stern, ed. U.S. Trade Policies in a Changing
World Economy ( Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1987), 344-45.
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distort the volume, direction, or product composition of
international trade."20 GATT studies have shown that the
share of world commodity export value of LDCs, other than
Southern European and oil-exporting countries, declined from
19 percent to 12 percent from 1955 to 1976. Among other
causes, reduced export earnings caused the same countries'
share of commodity imports to fall from 21 percent to 15
percent over the same period.21

Table 1.
Relative Share of Imports Subject to Nontariff Measures,
May 1985 (World Trade Weighted)

Agriculture

UNITED STATES
Imports from
all countries
industrial countries
developing countries

11.5
11.7
11.8

EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
Imports from
all countries
industrial countries
developing countries

37. 8
46.7
27.5

Manufac
turing

5.6
2.7
14.4

10.1
5.7
21.4

Textiles
& Clothing

47.8
25.5
65.3

42.4
13.6
65.2

Source: Julio J. Nogues, Andrzej Olechowski, and Alan
Winters, The Establishment of Non-tariff Barriers to
Industrial Countries' Imports. World Bank Department
Research Department Discussion Paper No. 115 (January 1985).
20American Economic Review Vol LXI no. 2 (1971): 196.
21Hartland-Thunberg, 20.
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The table above illustrates the rise in protectionism
in the form of NTBs and reveals the discriminatory pattern
of protectionism whereby industrialized nations have a freer
access to each other's markets as compared to market shares
of developing countries.
The table reveals that the textile sector has been
unusually singled out for restrictions. Such protectionism
warrants closer examination and this is what the paper
focuses on. In the following chapters, I examine the
rationale and implications of the MFA. In the next chapter,
I provide a brief history of the MFA, stressing its
increasingly protectionist nature which is in contradiction
to the aims cited in the text of the Arrangement. In
chapters 3, 4, and 5 I identify three principal aims of the
Arrangement which were: to achieve the expansion of trade,
the reduction of barriers to such trade and the progressive
liberalization of world trade in textile products; to
achieve the expansion of trade while at the same time
ensuring the orderly and equitable development of this trade
and the avoidance of disruptive effects in individual
markets; and, to further the economic and social development
of developing countries.

In each of these chapters, I take

up each of the aims individually and provide empirical
evidence to show that none of the stated aims has been
fulfilled or worked towards since the Arrangement came into
effect.

CHAPTER 2

International trade in textiles accounts for nearly
five percent of the total world trade and nearly nine
percent of world trade in manufactures. The textile industry
is significant to the national economies of both developed
as well as less developed countries. It provides employment
to a large percentage of the national population of both the
Northern and Southern countries.

In the United States, for

example, one out of eight industrial jobs is in the textile
or apparel industry, which employs over 2.25 million
workers, including nearly 1 million women and minorities.
The textile and apparel industry supports an additional
million workers in other sectors of the U.S. economy,
including agriculture, manufacturing, transportation, and
services.22
The importance of the textile sector in less developed
countries cannot be overstated. It is one of the major
industries in which developing nations enjoy comparative
advantage, given the relatively unsophisticated methods of
production and low wages. It does not require massive
capital investment as most other industries do. Most

22Ying Pik Choi, Hwa Soo Chung and Nicolas Marian, The MFA
in Theory and Practice (London: Francis Printer, 1985), 3.
18
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importantly, its labor-intensive characteristic is a boon
for overpopulated Third World countries. It is a haven for
unskilled and semi-skilled laborers found in abundance in
these economies. The industry employs approximately 30
percent of the labor force in all developing countries.23
Today, the textile and apparel industry is by far the
most protected industry in the world. In fact, duties on
textile imports are over six times the average of nontextile imports. For nearly twenty-five years, under the
Multi-Fiber Arrangement, the United States and other
industrialized countries have taken special measures to curb
imports of textiles and apparel from developing countries.
Protection in other sectors like steel and automobiles have
come and gone but the textile industry has not witnessed any
relief from restrictive trade barriers. By 1990 the United
States had 1000 individual quotas and 38 bilateral
"agreements", all negotiated under the MFA.
The following discussion examines the origins of the
MFA and traces its historical record of increasing
protectionism. I show how it was supposed to be a temporary
arrangement for a period of four years to give the developed
nations the time to regain their competitive edge and how it
continued its lease on life so that it exists to this day.

23"The Rag Trade: On the Road from Mandalay," Economist
303 (April-June 1987): 67.
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BIRTH OP THE MPA

The roots of the MFA can be traced to the early 1960s
with the signing of the Short Term Cotton Textiles
Arrangement (STA) in 1961, followed by the more
comprehensive Long Term Cotton Textile Arrangement (LTA) in
1962. During the 1950s, the US cotton textile industry was
facing a crisis due to an excess capacity in cotton
textiles, a rising demand for synthetic fibers, and more
important, increased imports from Japan. To redress these
difficulties, at least partially, American decision-makers
confronted Japan. The Japanese were asked either to restrain
their exports of cotton textiles "voluntarily" or face the
possibility of Congress passing quotas on Japanese goods,
the spread of state and local boycotts against Japanese
textiles, and the implementation of restrictive tariffs,
which were likely to be recommended by the United States
Tariff Commission.24 The outcome was the first VER in
postwar period. Japan, with its heavy reliance on American
markets for its textile trade, agreed to "voluntary"
restraints, fearing to enter into any legislated bilateral
agreements that "might at any time be upset by a capricious
Congress."25 This proved to be a watershed in the history

24David B. Yoffie, Power and Protectionism: Strategies of
Newlv Industrializing Countries (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1983), 43.
25Susan Strange, "The Management of Surplus Capacity",
International Organization 33 (Summer 1979): 311.
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of North-South protectionism. It set the precedent for the
next thirty years of crippling restraints in the
international textile trading regime.
At this time developing countries like India, Portugal,
Hong Kong and Egypt stepped in and began to flood U.S.
markets with their cotton textile exports. The U.S.
government concluded that some sort of a global market
arrangement was necessary to limit imports. It set up the
Working Party on the Avoidance of Market Disruption in 1959.
Under its aegis, in July 1961 an international Short Term
Arrangement (STA) was established. It authorized one-year
restrictions for 64 categories of cotton textiles to avoid
market disruption until a more permanent mechanism could be
negotiated. In February 1962, 19 major trading nations
adopted the Long Term Arrangement (LTA) which was renewed in
1967 and again in 1970 through 1973 to facilitate "orderly
development of the trade in such products [cotton textiles]
so as progressively to increase export possibilities of less
developed countries and territories of Japan, while at the
same time avoiding disruptive conditions in import
markets.1,26
"Disruptive conditions" were defined as instances of
sharp import increases associated with low import prices not
attributable to dumping or foreign subsidies. The LTA,
26G. Paterson, Discrimination in International Trade: The
Policy Issues. 1945-1965 (N.J.: Princeton University Press,
1966), 309.
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therefore, targetted imports from developing countries as
these nations were the low cost suppliers. Also, the LTA
provided that restrictions could be applied against
individual countries rather than on a most-favored-nation
basis. The Arrangement, therefore, violated two significant
principles of the GATT— nondiscrimination and multi
lateralism.
Since the LTA regulated intervention only in cotton
products, LDCs stepped up exports of wool and man-made fiber
products. In response the US government drafted the
Arrangement Regarding International Trade in Textiles which
sought to expand the LTA to encompass trade in man-made
fiber and wool-based products in addition to cotton
textiles. Thus the Multi-Fiber Arrangement was born. "The
MFA marked the beginning of a highly sophisticated,
comprehensive protectionism ... establish[ing] a precedent
for multilateral restrictions that [were] potentially more
harmful than anything that preceded it."27
The first Arrangement (MFA I) appropriated from the LTA
the "market disruption" concept, the authorization to
negotiate bilateral agreements, and the power to impose
unilateral quotas. As a concession to exporters, a
quantitative specification was laid down with respect to the
restrictions. There was to be a

minimum 6 percent annual

growth rate in quotas for products under restraint.
27Yof f ie,

162.
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Exceptions were provided to this rule. For example, growth
rates could be lower than 6 percent when it was clear that a
situation of market disruption would recur if the higher
growth rate was applied. This "exception" clause was used
frequently by developed nations. For example, for the wool
industry, U.S. bilateral agreements under the MFA have
provided for growth no more than 1 percent annually on
grounds that a higher growth rate would cause market
disruptions at home.
When the MFA came up for renewal in 1977, member states
pressed for greater control over LDC exports. The extension
protocol renewing the MFA contained an amendment that
allowed "jointly agreed reasonable departures". How "jointly
agreed" the departures were between developed and developing
countries is debatable. MFA II not only allowed growth of
quotas at less than 6 percent but also zero or negative
growth in products considered "sensitive" by importing
countries. The EEC managed to use this clause to establish
global quotas for all low cost-countries for a number of
what it considered to be "sensitive" products: cotton yarn,
cotton fabric, spun synthetic weaves, knit shirts, sweaters,
trousers, blouses and woven shirts.28

28Joseph Pelzman, "The Multi-Fiber Arrangement" in I.
William Zartman, ed. Positive sum: Improving North-South
Negotiations (New Jersey: Transaction Books Inc., 1987), 156157 and William R. Cline, The Future of World Trade in
Textiles and Apparel
(Washington D.C.: Institute for
International Economics, 1987), 153.
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In December 1981, MFA III was signed. The new element
introduced was that of "anti-surge" which allowed the
developed nations to take "appropriate" measures against
sudden sharp increases in imports of sensitive products.
"Market disruption" was redefined to include the overall
growth of the market for the product in the importing
country and thus could take into account any decline in
growth resulting from any factor. In 1983, the Reagan
administration authorized a new "trigger" mechanism for
initiating "calls."

A "call" is a governmental action to

restrict imports of a category of textiles or apparel not
already under quota restraints. The government makes a call
by issuing a market statement which spells out the factors
which in its judgment is creating a situation whereby
domestic producers are being injured. Under the new
procedure, market disruption will be presumed to have
occurred and discussions for controls will be triggered
automatically when (i) global imports of a specific category
of goods has grown by 30 percent or when the ratio of
imports to domestic production is greater than 20 percent
and (ii) when imports from a specific supplier country equal
one percent of total US production in that category. "MFA
III is a standstill agreement. It protects the biggest
producer of textiles, the United States, and the largest
importer and exporter of textiles, the European Community.
It does not give the non-Lome, non-Mediterranean less
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developed countries a chance to expand their textile and
clothing exports. No magic of the market place is permitted
to work for the less developed countries under MFA III."29
In July 1986 MFA IV was signed for five years. It
underscored the determination of the signatories to continue
protectionism in the textile sector. Restrictive elements
like the anti-surge tool, a broadening of the coverage to
include all vegetable fibers like silk and ramie,
reaffirmation of the lower positive growth rate in the case
of "recurrence of exacerbation of a situation of market
disruption" and the recognition of the rate of growth of per
capita consumption as a relevant indicator in recurrence and
exacerbation of a market disruption situation, made the MFA
IV emerge as a highly protectionist Arrangement that finds
no parallel in international trade.
In the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations (1986-1990),
the MFA featured prominently on the agenda. Again, the North
won the rounds of debates so that the MFA has been renewed
again, although for only two years. It is scheduled to
expire in December 1992.

RATIONALE OF MFA

For all its protectionist history, the stated
objectives of the MFA were noble, calling for the promotion
29Douglas F. Lamont, Forcing Our Hand: America's Trade
Wars in the 1980s (Massachusetts: D^.C. Heath and Company,
1986), 157.
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and liberalization of trade in textiles and Third World
development. Article 1 stipulated the aims of the MFA:
—

to achieve expansion of trade, the reduction of barriers

to such trade and the progressive liberalization of world
trade in textile products. (Article 1, para. 2)
—

ensuring the orderly and equitable development of this

trade and avoidance of disruptive effects in individual
markets and on individual lines of production in both
importing and exporting countries. (Article 1, para. 2)
—

to further the economic and social development of

developing countries and secure a substantial increase in
their export earnings from textile products. (Article 1,
para. 3)
Thus, DCs as well as LDCs were to benefit. The MFA was
explicitly justified as a temporary device to give the
textile industry of the developed countries the time and
breathing space to regain its competitive edge while
ensuring at the same time that developing countries did not
lose their advantages from trading in a sector in which they
enjoyed comparative advantage. Trade was to expand, to
become open and liberal, and markets in both sets of
countries were to be prevented from disruption.
However, the MFA has not achieved its aims. Either the
aims were ignored in trade transactions or conceptual
weaknesses were exploited. This is what I focus on in the
following chapters.

CHAPTER 3

"The basic objectives shall be to achieve the expansion of
trade, the reduction of barriers to such trade and the
progressive liberalization of world trade in textile
products..."
Article 1, para. 2
The MFA established the promotion and liberalization of
trade in textiles as one of its essential aims. During the
drafting of the MFA, developed countries defended the
Textile Arrangement on grounds that it would promote world
trade by increasing the number of developing countries
exporting textiles. They argued that open competition for
access to the markets of developed countries would have
resulted in a few efficient developing countries capturing
an even larger share of the world export market than they
would have under the MFA. Their justification for the
Arrangement was that since it provided them the right to
impose and regulate quotas, they could provide quotas to
small suppliers and new entrants by cutting back on imports
from larger suppliers. Thus the MFA would promote trade by
getting more countries into the orbit of international trade
by either providing market shares or increasing market
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shares.30
The table below gives an idea of market shares of
developing countries in developed-country textile markets.
A cursory glance at the table would lead one to believe that
less developed countries were significantly flooding
developed-country markets. For example, imports into OECD
countries from these suppliers rose from under $600 billion
in 1963 to $2.8 billion in 1973 and $8.7 billion in 1984.

Table 2.
Imports into the OECD from 25 developing countries, 1963,
1973, and 1984
(million dollars, percentage shares in parentheses)
1963

1973

1984

China
30.6 (5.2)
South Korea
*
4.4 (0.8)
Taiwan
*'.
7.4 (1.2)
72.5 (12.3)
Hong Kong
Singapore
n. a .
114.9 (19.5)
Subtotal

329.0 (11.6)
303.3 (10.7)
221.2 (7.8)
306.4 (10.8)
26.7 (0.9)
1186.6 (41.8)

329.0 (11.6)
1,038.5 (12.0)
734.6 (8.5)
545.0 (6.3)
31.6 (0.4)
3,891.7(45.0)

Pakistan
Bangladesh
India
Sri Lanka
Thailand
Indonesia
Philippines
Subtotal

267.3 (9.4)
44.2 (1.6)
423.3 (14.9)
0.5 (0.0)
45.8 (1.6)
4.0 (0.1)
17.8 (0.6)
802.9 (28.3)

534.4 (6.2)
255.0 (2.9)
706.3 (8.2)
7.8 (0.1)
246.2 (2.8)
119.8 (1.4)
37.6(22.0)
1,907.0(22.0)

35.7 (6.0)
n. a.
308.3 (52.2)
0.2 (0.0)
0.6 (0.1)
0.4 (0.1)
2.7 (0.5)
347.8 (58.9)

[continued next page]
30Arthur Dunkel, "Lessons from Textile Experience for
General Trade Policy," World Economy Vol. 4 (1984): 364-366.
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1963

Haiti
Dominican Rep.
Costa* Rica
Colombia
Peru
Brazil
Argentina
Uruguay
Subtotal

2.9
0.0
0.0
1.4
0.3
1.9
2,3
1.4
10.2

1973

(0.5)
(0.0)
(0.0)
(0.2)
(0.0)
(0.3)
(0.4)
(0.2)
(1.7)

Greece
Portugal
Spain
Turkey
Yugoslavia
Subtotal

6.4 (1.1)
58.7 (9.9)
29.1 (4.9)
2 .5
(0.4)
20.7 (3.5)
117.3 (19.9)

Total

590.2

(100)

6.7
0.1
0.4
38.9
2.6
144.7
9.8
2.7
205. 8

1984

(0.2)
(0.0)
(0.0)
(1.4)
(0.1)
(5.1)
(0.3)
(0.1)
(7.2)

122.9 (4.3)
262. 1 (9.2)
109.9 (3.9)
78. 1 (2.7)
72.9 (2.6)
645. 9 (22.7)
2,841.2

(100)

15.9
3.2
1.4
56.2
115.0
573.3
11.1
22.6
798.8

(0.2)
(0.0)
(0,0)
(0.6)
(1.3)
(6.6)
(0.1)
(0.3)
(9.2)

411.3 (4.8)
575.1 (6.6)
451.8 (5.2)
467.9 (5.4)
152.6 (1.8)
2058.8(23.8)
8,656.3 (100)

n.a. not available
Source: OECD, Foreign Trade bv Commodities, series C, Vol.
2, DRI Data Base.
If these nominal values are deflated by an index of
unit values of exports from industrial countries, the annual
growth rates in real terms was 11.1 percent in 1963-73 and
4.0 percent in 1973-84.31 Growth in the 1970s was therefore
relatively slow especially when seen in comparison with
overall manufactured exports from developing countries

31William R. Cline, The Future of World Trade in
Textiles and Apparel (Washington, D.C.: Institute for
International Economics, 1987), 141.
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(defined narrowly to exclude processed foods and copper)
which grew in real terms at 15.6 percent annually from 1965
to 1973 and 12.4 percent from 1973 to 1980.32
From the data provided it is evident that in the early
1960s, India and Hong Kong dominated developing country
exports of textiles. Later in the decade and early 1970s,
South Korea and Taiwan achieved extraordinary export growth
to capture approximately 10 percent of textile exports each.
In a third distinct phase, mainland China emerged forcefully
in the market to capture nearly 18 percent of developingcountry exports of textiles.
It is clear from the table that there has been no
similar explosive growth in exports from countries other
than Korea, Taiwan, and China. On the contrary, there have
been major declines in market shares: for India, from 52
percent of•-textiles in 1963 to 8 percent in 1984? Colombia's
market share was halved from 1.4 to 0.6 percent. By region,
.the five East Asian countries doubled their share in
textiles from 1963 to 1984 to nearly half of the export
market. In contrast, the rest of Asia, including India,
experienced a decline in trade share from 59 percent of
developing-country exports in 1963 to only 22 percent in
1984. In Latin America, only Brazil achieved a relatively
large share of textile exports. For their part, the
Mediterranean countries of Europe held relatively constant
32Cline,

141.
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market-shares, at approximately one-fifth of developingcountry exports.
The table therefore reveals a highly skewed
distribution of textile exports from developing countries to
the industrial countries. The four big suppliers (Hong Kong,
Korea, Taiwan and China) in 1984 accounted for 44.6 percent
of textile exports. This extreme concentration raises
significant policy issues. In particular, it means that
insofar as the protection regime gives rise to quota rents
for suppliers, a disproportionate share of these rents have
been captured by the four East Asian countries. (Economic
Rents and their effects will be discussed in detail in
chapter 5). The MFA, therefore, has not expanded trade in
textiles for developing countries as a bloc. Selected
countries have had market shares increased at the expense of
weaker nations or new-comers.
The case of China warrants special attention. As is
evident from the table, China's exports of textiles have
accelerated rapidly in recent years. United States
authorities have tended to be more accommodating to China
than to the other large East Asian suppliers. This is
because China is in a much stronger position to threaten
political retaliation against restriction. Thus, the final
version of the 1985 bill for textile quotas in the United
States omitted China from the large cutbacks to be imposed
on the other three large East Asian suppliers because
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legislators were concerned that China would close its own
market.33 Previously, China had succeeded in repelling
tighter restrictions by threatening to cut off imports of
agricultural products from the United States.34
Africa is absent from the list of the top 25
developing-country suppliers of textiles. It must be
stressed that open trade in these products could be
especially important to many low-income countries in Africa.
These sectors are among the few for which the
unsophisticated level of industrial production in these
countries permits exports. While African nations typically
do not face quotas today, the scope for future growth of
their exports is necessarily constrained by the overall
regime of textile protection, which probably already
discourages investment for export expansion by posing the
threat of quota imposition if exports do rise substantially.
"In a regime of open trade, relatively rapid growth of
textile exports from latecomers among developing countries
could be expected. There would probably be a natural
evolution away from concentration of these exports among
Korea, Taiwan, and Hong Kong. In a regime of protected
global trade in textiles, policymakers play a major role in
33Washincrton Times. 1 July 1986, A8.
34I.M. Destler and John Odell, "The Politics of AntiProtection: Changing Forces in United States Trade Politics"
in William R. Cline, ed., Trade Policy in the 1980s
(Washington: Institute for International Economics, 1987),
143.
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allocating the scarce resource of an export market among the
many claimants in the developing world. It is not clear that
the present method of this allocation is either the most
equitable or the most efficient."35
Thus, the system of managed trade that the textile
sector has been subjected to tends to create circumstances
in which established firms, countries with already
substantial export interests and large trading nations enjoy
advantages over new firms, countries with as yet small
export sectors and developing countries in general. It can
be concluded therefore that the MFA did not liberalize and
expand trade. MFA I stipulated that quotas would grow
annually by 6 percent. However, no attempts were made to
increase levels of quotas, and bilateral agreements were
negotiated with sharply limited quota growth. For example,
the U.S. government, in 1977 offered Hong Kong a five year
agreement limiting the increase in quotas to 1.5 percent.36
Since 1974, when the first MFA came into effect, not once
has a quota for any country been increased by the target
annual rate of 6 percent.
The MFA, therefore, did not realize its objective of
trade liberalization in textiles. It may have opened markets
for some countries like China, liberalizing trade with them.

35Cline, 143.
36Susan Strange, "The Management of Surplus Capacity",
International Organization 33 (Summer 1979): 317.
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It did not do this, however, on a nondiscriminatory basis.
It closed or reduced market shares for politically less
favored countries like India. The MFA has hence not
succeeded in reducing trade barriers or discrimination but
has instead given the DCs a legal mechanism to erect and
tighten barriers— a mechanism for doing so in discriminatory
ways.

CHAPTER 4

"The basic objectives shall be to achieve expansion of trade
while at the same time ensuring the orderly and equitable
development of this trade and avoidance of disruptive
effects in individual markets."
Article 1, para. 2
"The determination of a situation of "market disruption", as
referred to in this Arrangement, shall be based on the
existence of serious damage to domestic producers or actual
threat thereof. The factors causing market disruption are a
sharp and substantial increase or imminent increase of
imports of particular products from particular sources."
Annex A
This chapter is essentially a continuation of the last:
the previous chapter discussed the MFA aim of promoting and
liberalizing trade; this chapter examines how conditions
were stipulated in the very same Article whereby
liberalization could be curtailed, and the volume of imports
from developing countries cut back drastically. The
conditions of import restrictions were phrased in ambiguous
terms which the North has interpreted to its own purposes.
The chapter begins by discussing this conceptual weakness in
the Arrangement, and then focuses on the question, "Is
market disruption in the textile sector primarily caused by
imports from developing countries"?
As cited above, one aim of the MFA was to avoid "market
35

36

disruption? How do we know when it exists? Who is
responsible for the disruption? What caused it? How do we
define "orderly growth"? How do we distinguish attempts to
assure "orderly" growth from protectionism? Nowhere in the
Arrangement do we find explanations or answers to these
basic questions.
Markets can be classified into product and factor
(labor and capital) markets. Markets are disrupted when
either of these fails to clear. In an ideal market, market
disruption never occurs. In the real world, of course,
markets rarely function perfectly. Disruption occurs
periodically, but this is the way competition always works.
In the case of the textile industry, we find a factor market
disruption. This has manifested itself in the form of
unemployed labor. For over twenty-five years, the MFA has
been justified, and in fact, has been made more
protectionist, on grounds that market disruption has
occurred in the textile industry of developed countries and
has been caused by "sharp and substantial" increases or
"imminent increases" in imports from "low cost" suppliers.
How much is "sharp"? How much is "substantial"? How is
"imminent increase" determined —

what factors tell us that

imminent increase is occurring? There is no clarification or
qualification of any of these terms in the Arrangement. The
term "market disruption" lies at the core of the
Arrangement. Its acceptance and incorporation legitimized
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the discriminatory imposition of quantitative restraints
against developing countries.

What this chapter is

particularly interested in, therefore, is establishing
whether, in fact, the so-called market disruption (here
interpreted as loss of jobs in the textile sector) has been
caused by imports from developing countries.
In the course of the last twenty five years,
industrialized nations like the U.S. have complained of
market disruption, or unemployment due to imports from
developing countries. Economists in their findings have,
however, argued that such a connection between imports and
unemployment in the textile sector is extremely limited:
"What is interesting is...that import competition
causes only a small fraction of employment losses for
most industries. The bulk of employment change comes
from changing labor productivity, real wages, general
levels of demand, or changes in expenditure patterns.
The fact that these results seem to hold up using a
variety of methods suggests robustness, and makes it
difficult to comprehend the continued vociferousness of
labor and industry."37
Using various methods of analysis, economists have
attacked the argument that imports are adversely affecting
employment in the textile and apparel industry. Peter Isard

37Catherine Mann, "Foreign Competition and Employment in
Import-Sensitive U.S. Industries" in Khosrow Fatemi, ed.
International Trade: Existing Problems and Prospective
Solutions (New York: Francis and Taylor, 1989), 176.
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(Vintage-Capital model)38, Charles R. Frank, Jr.39, Anne O.
Krueger40 (Accounting Method), Catherine Mann (General
Equilibrium Model)41, and Richard B. McKenzie (Statistical
Regression Analysis)42 have all reached the conclusion that
job losses in the textile and apparel industry can be
attributed to mechanization, rising labor productivity and
consumer demand and preferences.
This chapter focuses on the impact of domestic
variables on employment in the textile sector. The
introduction of sophisticated technology and its effects,
the concomitant rise in labor productivity, and fundamental
changes in skills required by the industry appear to be the
most important cause of employment erosion. In addition,
consumer demand and industrial competitiveness have, in
varying degrees, affected employment in the industry over
the last three decades.

38Peter Israd, "Employment Impacts of Textile Imports and
Investment: A Vintage-Capital Model,11 American Economic Review
Vol. 63, No. 3 (June 1973) 402-16.
39Charles R. Frank, Jr., Foreign Trade and Domestic Aid
(Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1977), 27.
40Anne O. Krueger, "Protectionist Pressures, Imports and
Employment in the United States," Scandinavian Journal of
Economics Vol. 82, no. 2 (1980), 133-146.
41Catherine Mann, 174-195.
3
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TECHNOLOGY AND ITS EFFECTS

In the 1960s, the conjuncture of a booming economy, the
relatively steep decline in interest rates, revision of
depreciation rates, beneficial tax adjustments and rising
imports encouraged textile firms to invest in new equipment.
Capital investment more than doubled in the five years from
$330 million in 1961 to $820 million in 1966. The seventies
witnessed smaller outlays due to the recession but by 1977
the outlays had recovered to $1.2 billion. Capital
expenditure began to climb steadily once again reaching
$1.62 in 1980, soaring to $2.0 billion in 1987 and then
hitting a record high of $2.2 billion in 1988 and 1989.43
Such massive investments saw the textile industry
emerge as one of the most mechanized manufacturing sectors
in the US.44 These investments radically modified existing
machinery, and introduced high-tech machinery and equipment
including micro-electronic technology like computers.
Computer-controlled operations are growing on an
extensive scale in the textile and apparel industries. They
are now used directly in labor processes such as running
looms, dyeing and finishing. Robots, controlled by
computers, have increasingly replaced semi-skilled and

43U.S. Industrial Outlook, various issues/years
44Lauren Benton, Thomas R. Bailey, Thierry Noyelle, and
Thomas M. Stanback, Jr. , Employee Training and U.S.
Competitiveness: Lessons for the 1990s (Boulder: Westview
Press, 1991), 46-47.
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unskilled workers as they have been programmed to perform a
wide array of functions ranging from unloading materials
from trucks to placing heavy beams of yarns in racks, from
placing the filling yarn on conveyor belts to delivery to
weaving sheds. Computers have been introduced in accounting,
inventory control, production planning and inspection of the
plant.
Such automation has filtered into every production
process.

Manual operations including creeling (loading),

doffing, repairing broken fibers, operating machine controls
have been transferred in varying degrees to machines,
sometimes integrating distinct

processestoincrease

efficiency. The spinning operation is a prime example of
such transference and integration. Workers in this process
used to comprise approximately 20 percent of all mill
machine workers. The new technique, "rotor" or "open-end
spinning", has eliminated this 20 percent of the textile
labor force. Productivity has in turn increased 400 to 500
percent by eliminating the conventional spindle and
integrating the roving, spinning and winding process. Also,
while manual doffing took an average of 18.65 minutes,
automatic doffing performs the
Sophisticated technology,

same taskin 7.07 minutes.45
brings inits wake high labor

productivity. Between 1973 and 1984 textile employment

45Barry A. Turchil, Capital-Labor Relations in the U.S.
Textile Industry (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1988), 26-27.
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decreased by approximately 264,000 workers while, at the
same time, worker productivity rose by 49 percent. Overall
(1960-1984 period) worker productivity, defined as monetary
value of real shipments per worker, increased 147 percent,
rising in real (1984) dollars from $31,407 per worker in
1960 to $77,526 per worker in 19 84 .46 According, to an index
compiled by the Department of Commerce, between 1977 and
1990, textile mill productivity, as measured by output per
worker hour has increased some 37 percent. This averages out
to 3.9 percent, versus, 3.0 percent for all manufacturing
annually.47 (A one percent increase in productivity in
textiles can be expected to lead to a 0.4 6 percent reduction
in textile employment) ,48
State-of-the-art technology has mechanized labor
processes and enhanced labor productivity to such high
levels that there has been a fundamental change in the need
for, and type of workers in, this industry today. Managers
see a much more urgent need for literacy and math skills
among their operators to run the machinery. Workers have to
have the ability to respond to a more varied, faster
changing work environment. They have to have a broader grasp
of the production process if they are to contribute to the
goal of preventing rather than simply responding to machine
46McKenzie, 164.
47Industry Surveys, October 1990, Volume 2, T78.
48McKenzie,

170.
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stoppages.
With such a fundamental change in the production
process, it is inevitable that employment will be affected.
Thus, to attribute market disruption to imports from
developing countries is to ignore the fact that the problem
is largely internal and to shift responsibility for
adjustment from domestic to international actors.

THE EFFECTS OF CHANGES IN CONSUMER TASTES

Consumers are ultimately the most important
determinants of production and supply of any product. The
textile and apparel industry, particularly the apparel
industry is extremely vulnerable to the whims of consumers.
The business is a risky one, due largely to the frequent
changes in seasons, styles, and fashions. This volatility is
a nonimport-related cause of some of the attrition that took
place in the industry. Some decline in the number of firms
and in employment in particular product segments within the
apparel industry resulted from changes in consumers'
preferences. Men's tailored clothing, women's dresses, and
heavily tailored coats lost ground to more casual,
nontailored varieties, separate blouses and skirts,
pantsuits and year-round raincoats. In addition, the move to
women's separates also decreased the demand for full slips.
Many companies went out of business by attempting to hold on
to these declining product lines, rather than shifting to
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more promising ones.49
Also, the industry finds itself constantly guessing

as

to how much consumers are willing to spend on textiles and
clothing for a particular year or season. Consumer spending
over the years has been very sluggish and erratic. In 1988,
for example, the apparel industry found that consumers kept
their wallets and pocketbooks tightly closed going on a
sudden shopping spree towards the end of 1988 and early 1989
when annual consumer spending stood at 8.1 percent above
year earlier levels. It then began a steady decline, hitting
6.2 percent by October. Although apparel expenditure has
been climbing since 1975, from $65 billion in 1975 to 165
billion in 1989, apparel expenditure as percentage of
disposable income has shown a steady decline since 1975.
While in 1975, the percentage was 5.4, by 1985 it was 4.7,
reaching a record low of 4.5 in 1989. Hence consumption has
not helped the industry at all. Low levels of consumption
have either forced the industry to cut back production, or
as in the case of smaller enterprises to close down their
plant. Thus to identify imports as the main reason for
unemployment is simply inaccurate.

49Jeffrey S. Arpan, Jose de la Torre and Brian Toyne, The
U.S. Apparel Industry: International Challenge. Domestic
Response (Georgia: Business Publishing Division, Georgia State
University, 1982), 95.
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INTRA- AND INTER-INDUSTRY COMPETITIVENESS

Inter- and intra-industry competition has also caused a
significant displacement of workers. Domestic competition
with other industries over traditional textile markets has
been increasing. For example, developments in the
manufacture of paper and plastics forced textile
manufacturers to compete in domestic markets such as bagging
and automobile upholstery.
"In any competitive industry, competitive
attrition always takes place. Many of the US
apparel firms that closed in the past two decades
would have closed even without import competition,
because they could not compete with more efficient
domestic firms."50
During the last couple of decades, the textile and
apparel industry has undergone a major structural change.
Intra-industry competition has wiped out a large number of
smaller units in the industry. The introduction of new forms
of technology and synthetic fiber production is affordable
mainly to large firms. They are in a better position to
exploit discoveries and find new markets. Smaller
enterprises cannot compete effectively with consolidated
firms such as Burlington Industries and J.P. Stevens that
have become pacesetters in the industry. And bankruptcies
and mergers have increased since the early 1960s, displacing
a large part of the textile and apparel labor force.
Thus, most of the jobs lost in the textile and apparel
50Arpan, et al, 93.
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industry in the last three decades were caused by plant
modernization, changes in demand, and industry consolidation
rather than by imports from low-cost suppliers.

CHAPTER 5

"A principal aim in the implementation of this Arrangement
shall be to further the economic and social development of
developing countries and secure a substantial increase in
their export earnings from textile products and to provide
scope for a greater share for them in world trade in these
products...11
Article 1, para. 3
The MFA thus embodied a noble aim of Third World
country development. One way the MFA was supposed to benefit
developing countries was by providing them quota rents.
Quota rent is the value of import licenses equal to the
difference between the domestic market wholesale price of
the product and the tariff-inclusive supply price of the
competing import. In the case of an import-licensing scheme,
the recipients of the import licenses are likely to enjoy
the quota rents. In the case of a voluntary export-restraint
agreement like the MFA, since quotas are administered by the
exporting country, the exporting country in principle
captures the quota rent. The distribution of rent within the
exporting country varies according to the peculiarities of
the allocation system of each restrained country, and the
amount of the rent depends upon the strength of demand and
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degree of restraint.51

COST OF RENT-SEEKING ACTIVITIES

Technically, rents are beneficial, providing exporting
countries with additional earnings. In reality, however,
rent seeking or the competition for rents involves high
costs for the seekers, as demonstrated by Anne Krueger.52
The process of acquiring rents nullifies its benefits. The
real resources used up in such activity are generally
regarded as being wasted because their use does not create
new wealth but merely transfers existing wealth between
groups or individuals. Rent seeking takes various forms, the
most obvious of which are direct lobbying of politicians
(involving such costs as trips to the capital city and
establishing premises there), over-investment in physical
plant (to qualify for licenses allocated in proportions to
firms' capacities), bribery and other forms of corruption.
Krueger's findings reveal that in many countries these quota
rents (and the associated rent-seeking costs) can be very
large indeed. For example, she calculates that in India in
1974, total rents amounted to 7.3 percent of GNP. Of this
figure, rents associated with import licenses represented
51Ying-Pik Choi, Hwa Soo Chung and Nicoleas Marian, The
MFA in Theory and Practice (London: Frances Pinter, 1985),
105.
52Anne 0. Krueger, "The Political Economy of the RentSeeking Society'?, American Economic Review 64 no. 2 (1976):
291-303.
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over two-thirds. In 1978, quota rents in Turkey were
calculated to be about 15 percent of GNP. Moreover, there is
reason to suppose that the rent seeking associated with
quota licenses is just the tip of the iceberg. For example,
by including other distortions such as price controls and
rationing, Mohammed and Whalley estimate total contestable
rents to be somewhere between 30 and 45 per cent of GNP.53
While it is true that some developing countries are
partly compensated by these rents, their importance has been
exaggerated. It is not clear how much of the rent accrues to
the exporting country in actual practice.•Trade diversion
erodes the potential rent accruing to developing countries
as importers can buy from non restrained sources. Moreover,
the restrained supplier also runs the risk of not being able
to fill his export quota, for which he will be penalized by
his own government by being allocated a smaller export quota
next period.54

QUOTAS AND VESTED INTERESTS

New entrants, small suppliers, and poor countries with
little or no political clout are unable to reap any of the
benefits stemming from quota rents so that they suffer with

53S. Mohammed and J. Whalley, "Rent Seeking in India: Its
Cost and Policy Significance" in Neil Vousden, The Economics
of Trade Protection (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1990), 75.
54Choi, et al. 106.
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no hope of economic or social development. This is mainly
because quota rents cause vested interests. In fact, a
recurring theme in a study of the MFA by the GATT
Secretariat in 1984 was the role of the vested interests
created by the MFA.55 The study showed that under a system
of voluntary export-restraint agreements, there is a need to
develop procedures for distributing the export-1icenses.
This can stimulate the creation of cartel-like agreements
among existing exporters which tend to keep out new firms.
If the export licenses, as is usually the case, are
distributed on the basis of past performance, new firms may
not be able to get on the allocation list or may receive
only a token amount of export licenses. As in the case of
the quota rents, this creates vested interests in the status
quo among established exporting firms.56

QUOTAS AND PRODUCT QUALITY

Another line of defense for the MFA was that quotas
encourage restrained countries to upgrade the quality of
their items. How far is this true? Small suppliers and new
entrants do not experience these advantages. Their
industrial base is modest compared to that of leading
supplier countries. They do not possess the machinery
55GATT Secretariat, Textiles and Clothing in the World
Economy. GATT Doc. 84-1473 (Geneva: GATT Secretarial, 1984).
56Arthur Dunkel, "Lessons from Textile Experience for
General Trade Policy", World Economy Vol. 4 (1984): 363-364.
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required to produce material that is of a higher quality
than those produced in countries like Japan and Hong Kong.
It was argued that if a country was unable to compete
due to failure to upgrade its quality of product, this would
have

beneficial consequences. It would encourage the

country to move into less-restrained or non-restrained
categories and tap new markets, or diversify out of clothing
and textiles into more capital-intensive industries, such as
automobiles, chemicals and steel. However, experience shows
that when a country diversifies into a non-restrained
category, with the growing specter of protectionism it is
not long before the non-restrained category becomes a
restrained one.
As Ying-Poi Chik, et al. point out, quota systems have
demonstrated adverse effects over the years: 57
1) Most quota allocations tend to favor established firms at
the expense of new firms, thereby inhibiting competition
among firms and reducing efficiency in the textile and
clothing industry of developing countries. This encourages
the cartelization of firms, which tends to raise the price
of textiles and clothing products, not only for exports but
for domestic consumption as well.
2) The bilateral restrictions tend to place a heavy
administrative burden on developing countries which may lack
the experience and capacity to run the system efficiently.
57Ying-Pik Choi, et al, 25.
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Where an administrative infrastructure is in place the
discretionary power of the bureaucracy in allocating quotas
tends to favor larger, more established firms.
3) The quota system entails much more uncertainty for
potential investors and policy makers alike than other forms
of protection. It is hard to gauge when policy makers will
render the quotas more or less restrictive, since quota
system is subject to pressure from protectionist lobbies and
other political considerations. This element of uncertainty
adversely affects small suppliers more than large suppliers
as larger suppliers are able to recover faster than poorer
nations if an expected quota has been denied.
Therefore, technically, quotas entail benefits for
restrained suppliers, but it must be stressed that these
gains are dwarfed by losses stemming from having to restrain
exports, and therefore production and employment, in sectors
in which they possess clear comparative advantage. Import
controls in viable industries like textile and clothing has
slowed economic growth in

most developing countries. The

reduction in the capacity to import capital goods has been
particularly significant in recent years because of severe
balance of payments constraints and growing debt burdens.
During the 1970s and 1980s Mexico and Brazil each
accumulated over $100 billion in foreign debt. For either
country the foreign debt exceeds its annual GNP and is
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several times its foreign exchange earnings each year.58

THE CASE OF BANGLADESH

Article 1, para 3 obliges developed countries to avoid
actions that would adversely affect the economies of the
developing exporters. However, evidence proves that these
obligations have not been respected. Restraints have been
imposed on imports from developing countries without
consideration of their level of economic development. Even
poor, heavily-aided countries like Bangladesh have found
themselves subjected to substantial restraints.
Bangladesh is one of the poorest countries in the
world. Like any other developing nation, her exports are
predominantly agricultural. In particular, the heavy
dependence on jute and jute products (Bangladesh's chief
item of export —

the world demand for which had decreased

noticeably between 1965 and 1983) meant that other exports
had to emerge to fill the gap left by the shrinking demand.
Fortunately for her, businessmen from the Republic of Korea
ventured into Bangladesh to transfer finance and technology
for increased production of clothing. The result was several
new clothing companies, leading to increased volumes of
clothing exports that were competitive in world markets.
Bangladesh's exports of clothing increased from almost
58Khosrow Fatemi, ed. , International Trade: Existing
Problems and Prospective Solutions (New York: Taylor and
Francis Inc., 1989), 5.
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nothing in fiscal year 1980-81 (less than one percent of
total exports) to about twelve and a half percent in fiscal
year 1984-85.59 Unfortunately for Bangladesh, she proved to
be too competitive. The United Kingdom, France, the United
States and Canada, all slapped quotas on Bangladesh, albeit
in accordance with provisions of the MFA and bilateral
agreements under it.
It is necessary here to look at the statistics of
Bangladesh's imports into the developing nations to get an
idea of the injustice meted out to her. In 1984,
Bangladesh's share of imports of manufactured goods into DCs
from LDCs amounted to 0.3 percent, compared with 50 percent
for East Asia's super-exporters (Japan, Hong Kong, Taiwan
etc.). Bangladesh's share in DCs' imports of clothing from
LDCs amounted to 0.2 percent, whereas imports from the
super-exporters accounted for more than 60 percent. And, in
the case of total clothing imports of the US from LDCs in
1984, Bangladesh had a share of 0.32 percent as against 66.7
percent for the super-exporters.60
The immediate impact on production in Bangladesh was to
close down operations that had just started.up. It is true
that production capacities in Bangladesh were being expanded
very rapidly but is such action justified in the case of a

59Dean Spinager, "Will the Multi-Fiber Arrangement Keep
Bangladesh Humble?" World Economy Volume 8 (1988): 78.
60Spinager, 80.
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country like Bangladesh, even if it is strictly speaking
legal? Being one of the countries at the very bottom of the
development ladder, Bangladesh learned how special is the
treatment actually accorded to her. The elbow room in
foreign trade for a country without international political
clout is limited, at least in textiles and clothing, the
natural starting point of an export-oriented strategy for
development.

CONCLUSION

Thus, we see that the North has not fulfilled an
important objective of the MFA— to assist the development of
developing countries. It has instead, inter alia, reduced
their export earnings, in turn reduced their capacity to
import sophisticated machinery that is so essential for
production and, consequently, development. The MFA has
reduced benefits from specialization as it has forced
developing countries to forgo output and exports in an
industry in which they have comparative advantage. More
important, it has reduced employment opportunities. A common
characteristic of developing countries is overpopulation. It
is well known that an advantage of expanding trade is
increased employment. The North, through the MFA, has
deprived the South from giving its burgeoning numbers an
opportunity for employment and improving its standard of
living. We cannot even begin to determine the consequences
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of protectionism under the MFA when it is imposed on a poor,
densely populated country like Bangladesh where the current
population is 116.6 million and expected to double in less
than 28 years'

CONCLUSION

The preceding discussion has made it clear that the MFA
did not realize its stated aims. Textile trade has not
expanded; there has been no reduction in barriers to textile
trade; and, no progressive liberalization of world trade in
textiles. LDCs have not witnessed gradual increases in
market shares as promised by the MFA. Quotas never rose
annually by the stipulated figure of 6 percent.'
Each protocol of renewal was more stringent than the
previous preventing liberalization that may have occurred if
the ’'magic" of market place was allowed to work.
The MFA did not benefit all developing nations as was
expected. It prevented most of them from reaping benefits
stemming from comparative advantage. It provided the
industrialized countries a legal mechanism to impose
restrictions and hence precluded them from increasing export
earnings through trade in textiles. Newly industrializing
countries were singularly affected by the MFA. They were
squeezed out by politically stronger suppliers like the
NICs, which enjoyed higher status in the international
trading order, and prevented them from breaking in and
56
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securing market shares. In addition, competition for rents
involved high costs which they could ill afford.
The MFA has emptied the GATT of much of its substantive
content. The basic GATT principles of nondiscrimination,
predictability and transparency, so essential for an
efficient liberal trading order have been eroded.
Admittedly, industrialized countries attempted to reconcile
the MFA with the spirit of the GATT: the stated objectives
of the MFA promised liberalization of textile trade,
avoidance of market disruptions, and the economic and social
development of developing nations. However, in execution,
the MFA consistently and unambiguously violated the spirit
of the GATT. It violates the most-favored-nation principle
by permitting discriminatory treatment among supplier
countries. It breaks the general GATT mandate of applying
tariff rather than quota protection. It undermines the
principle of assured market access through tariff binding by
making access contingent. Importantly, the MFA also
establishes a precedent of imposing quantitative
restrictions against developing nations (in this case Japan
as well) but not against industrial countries.
The gap between the developed countries' rhetoric on
free trade and fact, as evidenced through the MFA, has been
well expressed by Hugh Corbert, Director of Trade Policy
Research Center in London:
If the liberal principles of the international trading
system, as expressed by the General Agreement on
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Tariffs and Trade (GATT) are to be preserved for the
benefit of all, merely verbal assertions by the
governments of developed countries of their commitment
to these principles are not enough. Governments have to
demonstrate that they mean what they say. They have to
repudiate the precedents for departures from those
principles. They have to convey a signal to the
unprotected industries. In short, they have to start
dismantling restrictive trade measures such as the
Multi-Fiber Arrangement, 'voluntary' export restraint
agreements, and non-tariff devices which destroy
trade.61
No causal link has been established between low-cost
imports from "particular sources" and "market disruption" in
importing countries. Yet, the MFA has now entered its fourth
decade, becoming more protectionist with each renewal. It
was stated in no uncertain terms that the Arrangement would
be temporary. Yet it has controlled trade and allocated
market shares in textiles for over thirty years.
Besides affecting LDCs adversely, the MFA has also
imposed costs on American consumers. Total consumer costs of
protection amount to $2.8 billion annually in textiles. The
average American householder pays about $238 every year to
retain some 235,000 jobs in the textile and apparel sectors
rather than elsewhere in the global economy. The consumer
cost per job saved is approximately $135,000 in textiles.62
It would not be wrong to state that the North has a
narrow vision of reality. It ignores certain fundamental

61Hugh Corbert, Preface to Costs of Protecting Jobs in
Textiles and Clothing, by Martin Wolf (London: Trade Policy
Research Center, 1984), xiv.
62Cline,

15.
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facts of economics. Third World nations will endeavor to
develop economically and socially. They will step up exports
of goods in which enjoy comparative advantage. Any growth of
manufactured exports by developing nations means competition
for developed nations. Many industries in the developed
nations will have to downsize as they to- reduce their costs
in order to compete. Layoffs will occur. New opportunities
are created. Adjustments have to be made. This is how a free
market works.
To turn to protection as a response to competition is
unwise. Experience has shown that import restrictions rarely
solve the problems of a domestic industry in the way that
they were originally intended to. Such restrictions
generally become a shelter from world competition and an
excuse to avoid dealing with the problem of productivity,
quality, innovation, and price. Rather than growing
stronger, the industry becomes dependent on government
protection and falls further behind its worldwide
competition. The MFA is a highly protectionist Arrangement
that should be phased-out if there is to be an international
trading order in textiles that is open and liberal, just and
equitable, a trading order envisaged by the GATT.

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

American Economic Review, "Rising Trade Barriers" Vol. 61
no.2 (1971): 190-205.
Arpan, Jeffrey S., Jose de la Torre, and Brian Toyne. The
U.S. Apparel Industry: International Challenge.
Domestic Response. Georgia: Business Publishing
Division, Georgia State University, 1982.
Benton, Lauren, Thomas R. Bailley, Thierry Noyelle, and
Thomas M. Stanback, Jr. Employee Training and U.S.
Competitiveness: Lessons for the 199 0s. Boulder:
Westview Press, 1991.
Bhagwati, Jagdish. Protectionism. Massachusetts: MIT Press,
1987.
British-North American Committee. The GATT Negotiations
1986-1990: Origins. Issues and Prospects. U.K.:
British-North American Committee, 1988.
Business Week. "Are America’s Manufacturers Finally Back on
the Map?" 17 November 1986, 92.
Chakravarthi, Raghavan. Recolonization: GATT, the Uruguay
Round and the Thirld World. U.K.: Zed Books Limited,
1990.
Choi, Ying-Pik, Hwa Soo Chung, and Nicolas Marian. The MFA
in Theory and Practice. London: Frances Pinter, 1985.
Cline, William R. The Future of World Trade in Textiles and
Apparel. Washington, D.C.: Institute for International
Economics, 1987.
Corbert, Hugh. Preface to Costs of Protecting Jobs in
Textiles and Clothing, by Martin Wolf. London: Trade
Policy Research Center, 1984.
Das, Bhagirath L. "The GATT Multi-Fiber Arrangement."
Journal of World Trade Law 17 (1983): 95-105.
Destler, I.M., and John Odell. The Politics of AntiProtection: Changing Forces in United States Trade
Politics. Washington, D.C.: Institute for International
Economics, 1987.
60

61

Dunkel, Arthur. "Lessons from.Textile Experience for General
Trade Policy." World Economy vol. 4 (1984): 361-368.
Fatemi, Khosrow, ed. International Trade: Existing Problems
and Prospective Solutions. New York: Taylor and Francis
Inc. 1989.
Finlayson, Jock, and Mark W. Zacher, "The GATT and the
Regulation of Trade Barriers: Regime Dynamics and
Functions". International Organization vol. 35 no. 4
(Autumn 1984): 561-602.
Frank, Jr., Charles R. Foreign Trade and Domestic Aid. .
Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1977.
Grey, Peter H. Free Trade or Protection? A Pragmatic
Analysis. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985.
Grilli, Enzo, and Enrico Sassoon, eds. The New Protectionist
Wave. New York: New York University Press, 1990.
Hartland-Thunberg, Penelope. Trading Blocs. U.S. Exports,
and World Trade. Boulder: Westview Press, 1980.
Israd, Peter. "Employment Impacts of Textile Imports and
Investment: A Vintage-Capital Model." American Economic
Review Vol. 63 no. 3 (June 1973): 402-16.
Jackson, John H. The World Trading System: Law and Policy of
International Economic Relations. Cambridge: MIT Press,
1989.
Jackson, John H. GATT Machinery and the Tokyo Round
Agreements. In Trade Policy in the 1980s. ed. William
R. Cline. Washington, D.C. Institute for International
Economics, 1987.
Jackson, John H., and William J. Davey. Legal Problems of
International Economic Relations. St. Paul: West
Publishing Company, 1986.
Krueger, Anne O. "The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking
Society." American Economic Review vol. 64 no. 2 (April
1974): 291-303.
Krueger, Anne O. "Protectionist Pressures, Imports and
Employment in the United States." Scandinavian Journal
of Economics Vol. 82 no.2 (1980): 133-146.
Lamont, Douglas F. Forcing Our Hand: America's Trade Wars in
the 1980s. Massachusetts: D.C. Heath and Company, 1986.

62

Mann, Catherine, "Foreign Competition and Employment in
Import-Sensitive U.S. Industries", in International
Trade: Existing Problems and Prospective Solutions, ed.
Khosrow Fatemi. New York: Francis and Taylor, 1989.
Mazumdar, Madhavi. "The Multi-Finer Arrangement (MFA IV)
1986-1991: A Move Towards a Liberalized System?"
Journal of World Trade Law 24 (1988): 109-123.
McKenzie, Richard B. The American Job Machine. New York:
Universe Books, 1988.
Mohammed, S., and J. Whalley. "Rent Seeking in India: Its
Cost and Policy Significance." In The Economics of
Trade Protection, ed. Neil Vousden. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1990.
Moore, Lynden. The Growth and Structure of International
Trade Since the Second World War. New Jersey: Barnes
and Noble Books, 1985.
Peterson, G. Discrimination in International Trade: The
Policy Issues. 1945-1965. New Jersey: Princeton
University Press, 1966.
Pelzman, Joseph, "The Multi-Fiber Arrangement" in Positive
Sum: Improving North-South Negotiations, ed. I. William
Zartman. New Jersey: Transaction Books Inc., 1987.
Spinager, Dean. "Will the Multi-Fiber Arrangement Keep
Bangladesh Humble?" World Economy vol. 8 (1988): 75-84.
Stern, Robert M., ed. U.S. Trade Policies in a Changing
World Economy. Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1987.
Strange, Susan. "The management of Surplus Capacity."
International Organization 33 (Summer 1979): 310-318.
Economist. "The Rag Trade: On the Road from Mandalay", 27
June 1987, p. 67.
Tumlir, Jan. Protectionism: Trade Policy in Democratic
Societies. Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise
Institute for Public Policy Research, 1985.
Turchil, Barry A. Capital-Labor Relations in the U.S.
Textile Industry. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1988.
U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Ways and Means. MultiFiber Arrangement Task Force Field Hearings: Hearings
before a Task Force of the Subcommittee on Trade of the
Committee on Wavs and Means. 95th Cong., 2nd Sess., 5

63

May 1978.
U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Ways and Means. Veto of
H.R. 1562: A Bill to Achieve the Objectives of the MFA
and to Promote the Economic Recovery of the US Textile
and Apparel Industry and its Workers. 99th Cong., 1st
Sess., 17 December 1985.
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Finance. Textile.
Apparel, and Footwear Trade Act of 1990. 101st Cong.,
2nd Sess., July 1990.
Wolfe, Martin. "How to Unravel the Multi-Fiber Arrangement."
World Economy 4 (1984): 235-247.
Wyndham-White, Eric. Negotiations in Prospect. In Toward a
New World Trade Policy: The Maidenhead Papers, ed. Fred
C. Bergsten. Massachusetts: D.C. Heath and Company,
1975.
Yoffie, David. Power and Protectionism: Strategies of Newly
Industrializing Countries. New York: Columbia
University Press, 1983.
Zartman, I. William, ed. Positive Sum: Improving North-South
Negotiations. New Jersey: Transaction Books Inc., 1987.

VITA

MEETA SEHGAL

Born in Calcutta, India, 13 July, 1965. Graduated from
Modern High School for Girls in Calcutta, India, April 1984.
Earned the Bachelor of Arts degree in Political Science from
St. Xavier's College, Calcutta, May 1988. Currently a Master
of Arts candidate at the College of William and Mary,
Virginia. The course requirements for this degree have been
completed, but not the thesis: Fabric of Tranny: The MultiFiber Arrangement in the Loom of North-South Politics.

